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  1Abstract 
 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to bring forward the analysis of time dimension 
in EU governance through the case study of EU Enlargement and the Turkish accession 
process. While doing this, comparanda with the recent fifth Enlargement of the EU 
involving the CEECs, and the Europeanization process will be made where relevant. 
  The main interrelated research questions in this context are as follows: Why study 
time during this stage of European integration? How and where does the temporality 
relate to the EU process of Turkey? What has the comparative research agenda to offer 
vis-à-vis Turkey with reference to the most recent enlargement wave (that is the CEECs)? 
How does the timing (political time) of core executives both in the EU and Turkey relate 
to the EU Enlargement in general and to accession process of Turkey in particular? 
Naturally the answers to these questions cannot be given at once, thus the current paper 
is reflecting only a work in progress and answers to the above questions are only outlined 
to a certain extent and the research continues.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to bring forward the analysis of time dimension 
in EU governance through the case study of EU Enlargement and the Turkish accession 
process. While doing this, comparanda with the recent fifth Enlargement of the EU 
involving the CEECs, and the Europeanization process will be made where relevant. In this 
context, the following sections will outline possible answers to the main interrelated 
questions as presented below. 
  The main interrelated research questions in this context are as follows: Why study 
time during this stage of European integration? How and where does the temporality 
relate to the EU enlargement process and EU conditionality as well as the accession 
process of Turkey? What has the comparative research agenda to offer with reference to 
the most recent enlargement wave (that is the CEECs)? How does the timing (political 
time) of core executives both in the EU and Turkey relate to the EU enlargement in 
general and to accession process of Turkey in particular? Naturally the answers to these 
questions cannot be given at once, thus the current paper is reflecting only an outline of 
answers to the above mentioned questions and the research continues.  
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  3Why study time, and temporality of EU enlargement now? 
Fundamentally, all the political processes have the time dimension and they all 
entail explicit or implicit usage of temporal rules and devices
2. For a neutral observer, 
perhaps a significant question in terms of the EU and its governance would be why study 
time at this stage of European integration. There can be several arguments in this 
context. However, the most relevant issues from view point of EU scholars are actually 
twofold: 
a.  to be able to identify the temporally specific aspects of EU governance 
analytically.  
b.  to be able to develop a scientific methodology and theoretical 
framework to sustain the results of the former. The theoretical and 
methodological discussion of temporality or the time dimension in EU 
governance is currently in the making (Meyer-Sahling, 2007 and Goetz, 
2006a and 2006b) and it is likely to introduce a fruitful agenda for 
future research in EU Governance. 
Once the research agenda focusing on the temporality of EU governance can be 
established through a sound methodology and a theoretical framework it is bound to open 
up new research horizons. 
  The study of temporality is definitely not a new issue but its usage in political 
theory and analysis has been neglected to a big extent so far
3. There are, however, 
several academic publications which point to the neglect of temporal analysis in politics 
and specifically in EU politics and governance (Schedler and Santiso, 1998; Pierson, 2000; 
Tilly, 1994, 1995; Schmitter and Santiso, 1998; Ekengren, 1997, 2002; Jerneck, 2000; 
and more recently Goetz, 2006; Meyer-Sahling, 2007) which might provide fruitful insights 
for future research. Among these, Ekengren in his well-known book “The Time of 
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3 See Goetz, 2006a and 2006b; Meyer-Sahling, 2007 on this. 
  4European Governance” points to a missing link in the analysis of the EU governance; the 
temporal dimension. He focuses explicitly on the ways to distinguish the temporal logic of 
EU governance while providing a thorough account and discussion of theoretical and 
pragmatic issues (Ekengren, 2002,  also Ekengren, 1997). Apart from this explicit focus 
on the temporality of European governance, there are other scholars who also have 
pointed out the importance of adding time dimension to political analysis (Schedler and 
Santiso, 1998; Schmitter and Santiso, 1998).  The necessity of adding the time dimension 
into analysis of EU governance and particularly the European administrative space has 
also been recently underlined by Goetz (2006a; 2006b) who persuasively discusses the 
significance of focusing on time dimension. The current paper is partially an attempt to 
apply the insights provided by above mentioned work to EU Enlargement and the Turkish 
accession process. 
At present, the answer to the above question, that is, why study time at this stage 
of European integration, manifests itself in the recent discussions about the absorption 
capacity of the EU as well as the hurdles around the EU Constitution, especially in the 
aftermath of the recent fifth enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. Obviously, 
the EU enlargement is a process relevant to the past, present and the future of the EU. It 
is well-known that the EU uses time rules in implementing this policy extensively. With the 
absorption capacity arguments, however, the EU indicates to have come to a saturation 
point in time and has the increasing tendency to buy time in terms of future enlargements 
in order to consolidate its governance structure with 27 members before continuing 
further
4, thus the use of temporal devices and rules are exponentially increasing. The case 
of EU enlargement towards CEECs, the periods from their candidacy to accession provides 
a significant laboratory for research in temporality of EU governance allowing also 
comparative work with the current enlargement policy. EU enlargement wave, as it is 
                                                 
4 See Durand and Missiroli, 2006; Emerson et al., 2006; Barysch, 2006 on the discussion regarding 
the absorption capacity of the EU. 
  5often called, connotes shape of time as manifested in EU governance
5. Briefly, the EU 
enlargement and the Europeanization process mainly going parallel with it (at least on 
part of the CEECs) evidently provide new horizons for research in EU governance through 
the study of time dimension. 
 
Temporality of EU Enlargement 
The recent CEEC enlargement engaged a group of states in negotiations and 
accession process with the EU where time pressure was explicit, and the competition 
among CEECs to transpose their national legislation vis-à-vis the EU acquis and close the 
negotiation chapters as soon as possible has meant a high tempo. The EU being ‘a 
moving target for the candidates’ (Grabbe, 2003) also adds to the temporal feature of the 
enlargement process. During the fifth enlargement, the CEECs had to show enormous 
effort not only to catch up with the EU acquis in a relatively short time but also not to lag 
behind other fellow negotiating neighbors. In such an environment, obviously, the EU 
used time rather effectively not only in terms of conditionality and through its powerful 
position vis-à-vis candidates but also while negotiating the derogations. Clearly, 
derogations are also temporal devices for buying time on part of the EU. Put it differently, 
the interaction between EU time tables and the domestic time tables in the CEECs worked 
basically in two significant ways during the fifth enlargement. First, by synchronizing the 
negotiations of CEECs the EU created a competitive pressure among them, squeezed their 
domestic time tables, and thus controlled the pace of reforms. Secondly, the asymmetric 
relationship between the EU and CEECs affected domestic transformation processes of 
CEECs or their Europeanization in a way which outweighed possible delays on part of the 
CEECs. 
                                                 
5 Personal communication of Philippe Schmitter during the CONSENT workshop on the ‘Temporality 
of European Governance and Europeanization’ on 15-16 February 2007. 
  6Throughout the EU enlargement processes, the EU evolved through ‘learning by 
doing’ so each enlargement wave created a revised or a new roadmap, timetable etc. For 
example, in the case of CEECs it was enough to adopt the EU acquis basically but with 
future enlargements implementation is required. Thus the time dimension comes more 
and more into the fore. Clearly, the accession negotiations of Turkey began in an 
unfavorable environment in October 2005 when the EU has already reached a saturation 
phase in terms of its governance structure as well as the enlargement. The increasingly 
pronounced absorption capacity arguments and the moves towards possible future public 
referenda on part of some individual EU member states vis-à-vis Turkish accession are 
clear indications of this among others. 
 
Temporality of the EU Conditionality 
There is substantial literature on the issue of EU conditionality and enlargement 
especially with reference to the recent fifth enlargement discussing specific aspects of it, 
and also in terms of Europeanization of the accession states, mainly CEECs
6,   however 
explicit analysis of temporality in this context is largely missing apart from partial 
employment of timing and sequencing of reforms and incentives on part of the EU and 
the candidates.  
As it is well-known, the EU conditionality is basically effective in two ways; 
democratization/continuous monitoring and implementation of democratic conditionality, 
and the acquis conditionality. Both are going hand in hand in the ongoing Turkish 
accession process whereas the democratic conditionality was largely left aside and 
replaced by acquis conditionality in the case of CEECs during much of the negotiation 
phase. This aspect and the uploading of the domestic political agenda as well as populism 
of the EU member states to the EU level, as reflected in the Turkish accession process, 
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  7increasingly decreases the credibility of the EU conditionality over time. This in a way 
indicates that extensive use of time rules can also be counter productive from view point 
of EU enlargement governance. 
An analysis by Tocci (2005) specifically points to the time dimension of 
conditionality. She discusses the ‘time inconsistency’ of the EU conditionality. Time 
inconsistency refers to that fact that since the EU expects the reforms to be completed in 
the short or medium term and the actual membership occurs in the longer term, the EU 
conditionality poses a problem on part of the candidates. She comments that “the process 
is front-loaded with obligations and back-loaded on the delivery of the benefits” (Tocci, 
2005:78). This accordingly poses a number of problems, for example, domestic policy 
makers are inclined to delay reforms until the time of benefits is foreseeable. The time 
inconsistency of EU conditionality is particularly evident in the Turkish accession process 
and will most likely continue to be so. 
Another important issue again raised by Tocci is that the timing and monitoring 
capability of the EU is limited due to the vagueness of the EU conditionality and this 
further creates problems throughout the negotiations (2005:79). 
In addition, the comparable rhythms in the EU, its member states and candidates 
are also obviously important in terms of time dimension of the implementation of 
conditionality throughout the enlargement process. This partially dwells on the general 
theoretical perspectives on the time dimension of democracy or state time where the 
electoral cycles or other political governance cycles intervene in the EU enlargement 
process.
7 As such there are also other issues to be mentioned in the next section which 
further indicate that Turkish accession process is a resourceful laboratory for analyzing 
time in the EU governance context.  
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also Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2007 who provide dynamic insights for the EU conditionality 
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  8Temporality of Turkish Accession Process 
Grabbe (2001) mentions five mechanisms as employed by the EU to affect change 
through conditionality and accession process. The first two are considered to be more 
relevant to Turkey. One is gate-keeping which means access to negotiations and further 
stages in the accession process. In this context, she highlights explicit usage of 
conditionality in a gate-keeping role for the CEECs.  In the case of Turkey, this means 
that on one hand, as the gate-keeper the EU decides the tempo of the negotiations. On 
the other hand, Turkey does not have the incentive of full membership in the foreseeable 
future and also the absence of immediate competitors like in the case of CEECs to insert 
group competition in the process, meaning that the tempo or pace of negotiations is also 
partially in the hands of Turkey. Given the current situation whether this is positive or 
negative outlook remains to be seen. Tempo was used during the accession of new 
member states as a sort of competitive benchmark and rivalry sustained the benefits of 
concessions for the EU. In the case of Turkey, this is clearly different. As it is known, the 
slow tempo of the reforms was criticized by the EU recently. Benchmarking and 
monitoring through Regular Reports are the second mechanism outlined by Grabbe and 
have also again the time dimension since the regular reports are annually written, and 
they also provide explicit and implicit time tables for policy and its implementation.  
Emerson provides further clues for the temporality of EU enlargement governance 
for future accession states also with specific reference to Turkey. He reads the small 
prints in the Council conclusions which are providing instruments for phasing the 
negotiations through time. Accordingly, there are three main sets of conditions as “i) 
Conditions for possible suspension of negotiations; ii) Conditions for transnational 
arrangements or derogations after accession; iii) conditions for alternative solutions if the 
negotiations fail” (2004:2). These conditions are clearly indicative of the temporal 
  9governance devices aimed by the EU member states given the reservations of some about 
the Turkish process, if nothing else. 
   Clearly, the cumulative experience arising from the CEEC enlargement provides a 
comparative analysis in the case of Turkish accession process and the analysis can go 
much detailed further. However, it is possible to highlight for the purposes of this paper at 
least four important points relevant to the analysis of time dimension of the Turkish 
accession process and temporality of EU enlargement to have a brief and comprehensive 
outlook.  
First, the ambiguity of time frame since the candidacy status of Turkey in 1999 
points to temporal aspect of EU enlargement. After the candidacy status, the unexpected 
high tempo of reforms realized in Turkey between 2001 and 2005 clearly urged the EU to 
opt for different possibilities of buying time.  We see here the interaction of the use of 
different temporal governance of both Turkish and the EU leaders.  First ‘giving a date for 
a date for the talk on opening negotiations’ with Turkey, and later the precondition of 
Cyprus issue only added to the ambiguity of the process. This also indicates how 
temporality is employed in enlargement process, highlighting that the EU leaders also 
came to understand that the process of Turkey was moving on in an almost irreversible 
way, and this was not in parallel with the domestic political time tables of the EU and its 
member states. 
Secondly, it is clear that the political weight attached to Turkish accession is 
different than the previous enlargements on the EU side. This in return affects the 
sequencing of the Turkish negotiation process. The recent hurdle around the suspension 
of eight negotiation chapters depending on the Cyprus issue, the ongoing pressure of the 
EU in democratic conditionality in the negotiation phase, and the move to create new 
definitions of minorities in Turkey while there is no such body of legislation applicable for 
the EU member states as such are clear manifestations.  
  10Thirdly, a brief comparison of political cycles in Turkey and the member states as 
well as in the EU itself provides and empirical focus, i.e. German elections, French 
elections and the exponentially increased  efforts on undermining Turkey in Western 
Europe. The arguments of Christian democrats on the so-called “privileged partnership” 
and the stance of France towards Turkey in line with the domestic political agendas as 
well as the continuous explicit remarks about the open-ended nature of the negotiations 
are clear examples of how domestic time tables of EU member states are reflected on the 
EU level as well as on the enlargement process. But this was not unique to EU member 
states only. In terms of temporal governance, the Turkish government also used the EU 
process or EU-ization of legislation (or premature Europeanization) as a legitimization tool 
where relevant and bought time in office as such until very recently. 
Finally, the shared time of the relevant actors on both sides seems to be 
decreasing exponentially. The recent developments in Turkey seems to point out to the 
fact that Turkish governing elite, business world and civil society teamed up to pursue an 
independent time table and a road map for reforms in Turkey (albeit mostly in line with 
the EU acquis) since the credibility of the EU soared, and therefore the conditionality of 
the EU is not taken seriously as it used to be
8. The government recently announced on 
April 2007 the fact that Turkey will continue its reforms with or without the EU, and there 
is no need to wait for opening or closing negotiation chapters with the EU for that. Put it 
differently, Turkey will model the EU acquis for reforms regardless of the EU. Thus the 
sequencing passed completely to the domestic political level. This is a critical juncture. It 
also indicates that the EU has lost much of its demandeur position vis-à-vis Turkey at 
least for the moment. At this critical juncture the EU not only needs to develop its own 
roadmap but also its roadmap with Turkey. This in return means that the current rather 
premature Europeanization process in Turkey is likely to be a two-way adjustment process 
                                                 
8 Euractive –“Turkey to adopt reforms even ıf the EU entry is blocked”  17 April 2007. 
  11as suggested recently by Dyson (2007) eventually, through which political time will have a 
pivotal role. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper briefly argued that given a sound methodological and theoretical framework, 
the analysis of time dimension of EU governance in general and with reference to specific 
EU policies such as Enlargement (and also Europeanization for that matter) in particular, 
have significant insights to offer for future research. In this context, Turkish accession 
process provides a good case study. However, clearly one needs to keep in mind that the 
analysis of time dimension in EU governance is in the making and thus more 
methodological/theoretical issues need to be resolved. 
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